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Glossary
Encoding Assigning a specific label to the information that
is to be stored in long term memory, in order to make it
suitable for storage, retrieval, and further processing.
Long term memory (LTM) A system able to hold a large
amount of episodic or semantic information permanently,
organized as a network.
Retrieval Activation of the information retained in long
term memory, presumably with the use of valid retrieval
cues or specific mental strategies.
Storage The intermediate phase of the memory process,
which consists in keeping the memorized information in the
latent form that potentially allows retrieval and further
processing.
Working memory (WM) System responsible for
maintaining a restricted number of pieces of information
for up to a few minutes; also acts as an information
processing unit, responsible for the manipulation of
symbols during problem solving and other types of
cognitive activity.88Memory is a psychological structure that, apart from its many
other functions, takes part in the cognitive mechanism of insight
in creative problem solving and determines the specificity of
information processing observed among creative individuals.
The importance of memory phenomena to understanding of
creativity is enormous, for obvious reasons: creativity is an
activity of mind, and activities of mind are executed through
memory. Therefore, creativity cannot occur without the partici-
pation of memory processes and structures. However, psy-
chological theory concerning the relationship of memory to
creativity is not well developed, and empirical results are rather
scarce. For these reasons, the present article outlines the map of
the problem at a very high level of abstraction and with a large
amount of speculation. The order of presentation is determined
by the stages of memory processes, corresponding to the stages
of information processing.Sensory Memory and Creativity
Stimuli arriving from the external world are first memorized
for a short time by two structures: sensory store and short-term
store. The sensory store (e.g., iconic memory for images or
echoic memory for sounds) holds the information for less
than one second. Because of its extremely short duration, the
sensory memory is not accessible for introspection, and people
usually do not realize that they possess such an ability. Both
iconic and echoic memory act at the preparatory stage of
stimulus elaboration, thanks to which the next stages are not
swamped by a surplus of information.
There is no evidence whatsoever that sensory memory is
connected in any way with creative processes or creative abil-
ities. Interestingly, though, the sensory memory may play an
important role in perception and appreciation of creative per-
formances, particularly in music, ballet, and visual arts. From
the evolutionary point of view, the sensory memory is still
mysterious, but it is possible that it evolved in the service of
speech perception. An ability to keep in mind sounds that havealready disappeared probably allows human beings to perceive
spoken language smoothly and rapidly. Without echoic mem-
ory it would be perceived as a staccato of separate sounds.
Keeping past sounds in mind for a moment makes this process
much more efficient. Words are perceived as complex struc-
tures rather than sets of unconnected vowels and consonants;
therefore they are recognized with enormous speed and effi-
ciency. Moreover, holistic perception of words makes it possi-
ble to use prosody and intonation as a means of speech
perception and, in consequence, as a means of language
comprehension.
This is just a hypothesis but if the reconstruction of
adaptive functions of the sensory memory outlined above is
close to reality, we could speculate about relationships be-
tween echoic memory and music perception, as well as
between iconic memory and ballet dancing perception. The
same mechanism that makes speech perception speedy and
efficient can produce greater appreciation of music (echoic
memory) or ballet dancing (iconic memory). One can even
doubt whether human beings would invent music and ballet as
important domains of creativity if they were not able to per-
ceive sounds and movements smoothly. Production of sounds
and structured body movements obviously serve important
social ends, such as communication, but these reasons seem
insufficient to invent the art of music or dancing. For that, our
ancestors had to be able to appreciate esthetic rather than
social aspects of sounds and movements, which – according
to my hypothesis – would not be possible without the phe-
nomenon of sensory memory.
These speculations lead to yet another hypothesis, namely,
that musical abilities (or just being fond of music) are rooted
in individual parameters of echoic memory. People who can
keep in their echoic memory more information for a slightly
longer time may be better prepared to appreciate and under-
stand music when compared with persons characterized by less
efficient mechanisms of sensory memory. However, this
hypothesis may be difficult to verify because individual differ-
ences in sensory memory have not been investigated at all.
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restricted, as it usually is in the case of basic, evolutionarily old,
and biologically rooted mechanisms.Working Memory and Creativity
The short-term memory (STM) store is able to retain informa-
tion for limited intervals of time, ranging form a few seconds to
several minutes. This system is now called working memory
(WM) because it is responsible for both maintaining pieces of
information and manipulating them, which is synonymous
with human information processing. Metaphorically speaking,
WM is a central processing unit of the human mind, or ‘the
blackboard of the mind.’ Less metaphorically, it is an active part
of memory consisting of a number of pieces of information that
are either in the state of readiness for upcoming processing or
in the state of just being processed. It is unlikely that the central
processing unit of the human mind would not take part in the
cognitive mechanics of creative processes. Some theoretical
models assume such an engagement in an explicit way. There
is, however, little empirical evidence about how and to what
extent working memory processes affect creativity.
Characteristically, WM is very limited not only in time but
also in its capacity, because it is able to manipulate fewer than
ten pieces of information (words, numbers, etc.) simultaneously.
Short-termmemory capacity is traditionally defined as the ‘magi-
cal’ number seven (plus or minus two) but this value is probably
overestimated. Recent estimates (e.g., Nelson Cowan’s) suggest
that working memory cannot retain and manipulate more
than four elements simultaneously. Although this is a very
small number, people still differ in working memory capacity
(WMC), and these differences result in different ability levels. It
has been convincingly shown that WMC determines the general
cognitive ability level (i.e., intelligence). Unfortunately, no evi-
dence concerning the relationship of WMC to creativity has been
obtained, although in some studies both intelligence and creativ-
ity tests were used to check this hypothesis.
The difference is probably rooted in the particularity of
cognitive mechanisms of intelligence and creativity as two dis-
tinct dimensions of human intellect. Intelligence is the ability
to tackle convergent, well-defined problems of average com-
plexity and average novelty. Such problems are well described
in terms of a number of separate ‘chunks’ of information, which
have to be memorized and manipulated for a short time in
order to let the problem solver reach the solution. In other
words, an intelligent problem solver has to split the problem
into separate portions of information, keep these portions in
working memory, and manipulate them in order to achieve a
suitable solution. In such cases, the more items a problem
solver is able to keep in the short-term store, the more compe-
tent he or she is in tests consisting of convergent, well-defined
problems of average complexity and novelty. On the contrary, if
a problem solver’s WM capacity is small by nature, or declines
for any reason, he or she inevitably loses some part of his or her
intellectual ability, because tasks that are critical for the person’s
intellectual level may surpass the actual limitations of WM.
Nothing like this seems to exist in the case of creativity. It is
usually assessed with tests consisting of divergent tasks of low
complexity (e.g., Unusual Uses, Alternative Definitions, etc.),which do not exploit working memory thoroughly. As far as
the limited capacity of WM is concerned, such problems may
even be regarded as relatively ‘easy.’ No surprise, then, that
creative abilities assessed with divergent thinking tests do not
correlate with WMC.
Of course, creativity is not reduced to simply divergent
thinking ability, particularly if real creative endeavors rather
than basic cognitive skills are taken into account. However,
there is no point in looking for the working memory determi-
nants of ‘real’ or eminent creativity, either. The problems
undertaken by exceptionally gifted creators and great achievers
are usually divergent, too, but also ill-defined and very com-
plex in nature. In fact, problem finding and problem definition
constitute the vital part of creative processes in real life, that is,
outside the psychological laboratory. Finding, definition,
redefinition, and solution of such problems usually take a lot
of time, effort, and motivation, but they do not seem to require
extended capacity of working memory. Individual differences
in WMC may matter in the case of problems of average com-
plexity, because – for instance – if a problem needs four items
to be kept and manipulated in memory, a person with a
capacity of four is naturally endowed to tackle such a problem,
whereas a person whose capacity is only three is naturally
unable to deal with it. But both hypothetical persons are
structurally unable to deal with a problem consisting of 100
or 1000 items of information, that is, with very complex,
unclear, ill-defined problems that require a creative approach.
This does not mean that such complex problems are
unworkable for any human being, whose WM capacity –
even relatively large – usually does not exceed four portions
of information. Rather rarely, a very complex and ill-defined
problem is solved by a very creative individual by means of his
or her exceptional capacities, but not necessarily by means of
WM capacity, as it seems. Such creative achievements are
attainable through specific strategies of problem solving, and
through inventive manipulations with problem structure and
problem definition. Such manipulations are sometimes
referred to as metacognitive strategies. For instance, a creative
person organizes his or her knowledge of the problem hier-
archically: a relatively small number of higher-order, abstract
portions of information may contain many lower-order chunks
of information, accessible for processing only after having been
‘unwrapped.’ Another metacognitive strategy used by creative
individuals amounts to simplification of the problem structure
so that it is workable with WM of limited capacity. However,
such manipulations refer to long-term memory processes,
mainly selective encoding and ‘familiarization.’
There is a paradoxical tension between the structural limita-
tions of WM in terms of the very small number of items that
can be effectively maintained and processed, on the one hand,
and the requirements of complex and ill-defined problems that
are typically undertaken in mature creativity, on the other
hand. If ‘creative problems’ are much too complex for human
working memory, nomatter how efficient and capacious it is in
the case of a given person, how can such problems be solved at
all? An interesting solution to this paradox comes from the
theory of long-term working memory (LTWM), developed by
K. Anders Ericsson and Walter Kintsch. LTWM is conceptua-
lized as a part of long-term store that is activated by retrieving
cues maintained in working memory proper. In other words,
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problem solving. It retains only retrieval cues, thanks to which
the vital information is quickly and easily retrieved from LTM.
Long-term store is not structurally limited, so there is no threat
of it being overloaded. And a person must keep in mind only a
few hints that make it possible to use a kind of ‘highway’
between WM and LTM. Ericsson and Kintsch believe that
their model accounts for expert performance in a variety of
domains, as well as for language comprehension. Since mature
creativity is a form of expertise, their model should be explored
more thoroughly in creativity studies.
Models of working memory usually assume that this struc-
ture shows two aspects: one purely mnemonic and another
pertaining to cognitive control. For instance, in the model
developed by Alan Baddeley the mnemonic functions are
performed by such ‘devices’ as the articulatory loop and the
visuo-spatial scratch pad, whereas the control functions are
performed by the central executive, which is described as a
‘device’ of attention deployment. The dual nature of working
memory suggests that creative thinking and creative perfor-
mance may be determined by efficiency of cognitive control
rather than by capacity of working memory understood as the
number of ‘chunks’ that can be memorized for a short period of
time. Or, possibly working memory capacity should be defined
as an ability to performmnemonic functions under the auspices
of control mechanisms. For instance, switching between tasks is
a popular means of investigating cognitive control. It seems that
creativity requires switching between thoughts rather than tasks.
An ability to switch from one mental activity to another is
probably vital for flexibility of thinking and resistance to mental
blocks. Such relationships have not been systematically studied,
although there are data suggesting that a high level of dopamine
increases the strength of cognitive control, reduces switch costs
in the task switching paradigm, and improves performance on
divergent thinking tasks, particularly if flexibility is taken into
account. Creativity probably needs both increased and reduced
cognitive control, depending on the phase of working on a
problem at hand. Such studies, if performed systematically,
should broaden knowledge about the relationship between cre-
ativity and working memory.Long Term Memory and Creativity
Contrary to working memory, long term memory is able to
retain information for an unlimited period; it is also assumed
to possess unlimited capacity. This does not mean that the
human mind is able to remember everything; however, forget-
ting and other imperfections of memory do not result from the
capacity of the LTM store but from other sources, such as
interference, inefficient strategies of remembering, etc.
Three basic categories of memory processes define the effi-
ciency of operations in LTM: encoding, storage, and retrieval.
These operations, or stages of the memory process, determine
the way inwhich LTMperforms its basic functions, including the
ones connected with creativity, problem solving, and insight.
Encoding
Information cannot be placed in long-term store without hav-
ing been encoded. This is an operation analogous to labelingproducts in a department store or allocating new books
to appropriate shelves in a library. Only after the information
is encoded can it be stored in memory as a part of related
knowledge structures. In most cases, encoding amounts to
categorization. For instance, the scene shown in a news head-
line is categorized as a ‘street accident,’ a portion of textbook
knowledge as ‘the quantum theory of particles,’ etc. The psy-
chological function of encoding is obvious: it allows assigning
the information to the appropriate parts of the LTM store. In
this way, it makes it possible to arrange LTM as an organized
system of knowledge. It is also a necessary condition for future
retrieval, because nothing can be regained from the store with-
out being properly labeled.
Creativity is probably connected with, and affected by, the
specificity of encoding in three ways. First, a person can encode
information in a peculiar way, different from other people. For
instance, a child can categorize the animals familiar to him or
her into the categories of nice, shaggy, and awesome. This kind
of categorization, though illogical and far from what biology
offers, probably serves some important cognitive needs of the
child. Such categorization is also unusual, different from what
the majority of people think about animals and how they
classify them. This is probably why small children perceive
the world so originally. Children’s originality is normally
accounted for in terms of their being free from obstacles, con-
ventions, and inhibitions typical of adult life. However, this
phenomenon should also be regarded as a manifestation of the
unusual way in which children categorize objects, and in con-
sequence as a result of the specific way of encoding informa-
tion that is stored in their LTM.
In the case of adult creative individuals, the instances of
bizarre categorization are probably accompanied by the con-
ventional, ‘uncreative’ way of perceiving the world. In other
words, an adult creative person is able to categorize the world
in the ‘official,’ objective, commonly accepted way, as well as
in the unusual, subjective, and personalized manner. This is
the second exemplification of how the activity of this stage of
LTM operations affects creativity: alternative encoding. A per-
son who encodes alternatively is able to take advantage of
unusual encoding (making unpredictable associations, dis-
cerning similarities, etc.), while still being close to reality
and conventions – a phenomenon recognized by Ernst Kris
as “regression in the service of the ego.” Some techniques of
creativity training deliberately focus on the phenomenon of
alternative encoding, with the conviction that divergent
thinking and unexpected associations are more likely to result
from the ability to memorize the same item of information in
many different ways.
The third property of encoding found in creative persons is
selectivity. It is particularly important for the construction of the
cognitive representation of the problem. Problems worth crea-
tive endeavor are usually too complex and ill defined to be
memorized completely and categorized with the use of clear-
cut terms. Selection of information is therefore necessary; how-
ever, successful problem solvers are able to memorize only
the important elements of the problem, while ignoring less
important and superfluous ones. Less efficient solvers try to
memorize everything, thus being unable to focus on the gist of
the problem situation. It is very unclear what the origins and
determinants of this ability to encode information in the
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development and training. However, the selectivity with which
some people store information in their LTM store inevitably
makes them more efficient solvers of complex, ill-defined pro-
blems; therefore, it makes them more creative.
Peculiar, alternative, and selective encoding are responsible
for creative behavior in many ways. They help people produce
original associations, they are responsible for ‘perceiving
things’ differently, and they allow simplification of the struc-
ture of excessively complex problems through selectivity of
encoding. In many instances, creative behavior is a result of
natural, effortless use of specific encoding, although from the
observer’s perspective it may give the impression of being a
result of rather difficult and complex processes. In other words,
creative processes are sometimes less ‘exotic’ than they seem to
be from the point of view of somebody who normally does not
encode information in a peculiar way.
Creativity also benefits from so called prospective encoding,
which involves setting up criteria for future acquisition of
knowledge that might be relevant to a problem at hand. Care-
ful examination of the problem and its requirements helps
establish exact criteria of information needed for the continua-
tion of creative problem solving. Such knowledge may not be
available at the moment. but it can be easily acquired upon the
appearance of particular learning opportunities. The mental
set established by prospective encoding induces highly selec-
tive acquisition of knowledge; consequently, it enhances the
likelihood of sudden and insightful recognition of new possi-
bilities for dealing with the problem.Storage
Storage amounts to keeping previously encoded information
for a long time. Contrary to naive conceptions of storage, it is
an active process, likely to impose unexpected changes on the
seemingly dormant information kept in LTM. Three phenom-
ena connected with storage are worth investigation from the
creativity point of view: selective forgetting, familiarization,
and spontaneous recovery.
Selective forgetting may account for the phenomenon of
‘incubation.’ According to the classical four-stage model
of creative thinking, incubation is a stage of unconscious
idea production, following preparation but preceding illumi-
nation and elaboration. Modern cognitive approaches do not
deny the empirical evidence that the ‘incubational’ break
sometimes helps in the creation of new ideas, although they
usually do not accept the notion of subconscious ‘incubation’
of solutions. It has therefore been suggested that, during the
‘incubational’ break, people selectively forget superfluous
information, particularly the unnecessary elements of the cog-
nitive representation of the problem. The memory preserves
only a part of the information that has been gathered
concerning the problem: its definition, requirements, and
context. After having forgotten a huge part of this informa-
tion, people are more likely to ‘view the problem from a new
perspective,’ that is, to experience sudden and holistic under-
standing of the problem, synonymous with insight.
‘Familiarization’ is another term introduced by Herbert
Simon in order to account for the phenomenon of ‘incuba-
tion.’ Simon assumed that problems worth creative endeavorsare complex and difficult, requiring a lot of time and effort to
be solved. During the long process of problem solving, almost
all trials seeking a solution are unsuccessful, except the final
ones that result in solutions. This does not mean that earlier
trials are worthless: their function amounts to ‘familiarization’
with the problem, that is, making it more and more under-
standable, clear, and simple. Simplification of the problem
structure and definition makes it possible to grasp it with a
small number of items of information. This, in turn, makes it
possible to manipulate the problem within the system of short-
term memory, which has very limited capacity to handle infor-
mation. In other words, every instance of problem solving relies
on the vital operations of workingmemory, which performs the
basic operations of information processing. But in order to be
suitable for such operations the problem has to be simplified to
a great extent; otherwise, the working memory system is likely
to be flooded. Familiarization is a means of making the prob-
lem simple enough to be dealt with by the system of working
memory. Thus, numerous unsuccessful trials seeking a solution
have an important simplifying function, due to which pro-
blems originally too complex becomemore andmoreworkable
for the very limited capacity of the memory system.
Spontaneous recovery consists in an increase of the likelihood
of recall of information if it is kept dormant for some period of
time, compared to the likelihood of recall at the beginning of
the learning process. It is assumed that vital information is
blocked by other pieces of knowledge, learned more recently
or acquired through the learner’s conviction of their impor-
tance. After some period of time the blocking pieces of infor-
mation lose their activation, thus yielding access to the
previously inaccessible knowledge. It is also assumed that the
LTM store becomes more and more organized with time, a
process taking place without any intention or effort on the
learner’s part. Due to such hypothetical processes, people can
sometimes remember more information after some time has
passed than at the beginning of the learning process – a phe-
nomenon known as ‘reminiscence.’ These phenomena are
important for creative thinking and problem solving because
they may be responsible for the elimination of mental sets,
blocks, and other obstacles often preventing poeple from
attaining original solutions. This is why ‘incubational’ breaks
probably help work out creative solutions, although there are
other cognitive mechanisms that operate with similar results
(e.g., selective forgetting, familiarization).
Selective forgetting, familiarization, and spontaneous
recovery are possible mechanisms of insight, which – according
to modern cognitive theories – is basically a memory phenom-
enon. From the phenomenological perspective, insight is a
sudden flash of understanding (‘Aha!’ response). From the
cognitive perspective, however, its mechanisms are probably
rooted in operations taking place in long-term memory
during the storage phase. However, recognition of such a
theoretical possibility requires that storage be viewed as an
active, purposeful, and ‘creative’ phase of LTM operations.
Spontaneous changes of the LTM structure during the storage
phase do not guarantee that insight will occur and help peo-
ple solve the problem in a creative way, but without these
cognitive operations the phenomenon of insight would
be very difficult to account for beyond its purely phenome-
nological aspects.
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Retrieval consists in recalling information previously encoded
and then kept in the LTM store. It is the reverse process to
encoding, and its efficiency mostly depends on encoding stra-
tegies used in the first stage of the memory process.
The main problem of retrieval amounts to accessibility of
information stored in LTM. Creative ideas are often just recov-
ered from memory, or they result from uncommon combina-
tion of stored memories, although they may create the
impression of being crafted out of nothing. In other words, a
creative idea – or at least the very core of it – remains in the
LTM store for a long time, ‘waiting’ to be noticed and used. The
difficulty lies in accessing such an idea or its bud, because it is
not kept in memory in its ready-made, easy to retrieve form. If
it were like this, it would probably be memorized and retrieved
easily by many people; as a result, such an idea would reappear
frequently and, by definition, could not be called creative. So,
the act of creation consists, by and large, in the use of effective
retrieval strategies, through which vital information may be
accessed and used in problem solving.
Hence, the problem lies in making already stored informa-
tion accessible, so that it can take part in the creative process.
This aim is achieved in two ways: by the use of appropriate
retrieval cues and by the application of effective strategies of
search of the LTM store. The retrieval cue is a means of decoding
information kept in the LTM store, analogous to the operation
of taking away an item from the shelf in the real storehouse,
library, or other kind of depot. Normally, the information is
retrieved from LTM with the use of exactly the same code (e.g.,
a category or label) with which it was put into the LTM store.
These are the instances of the commonplace use of memory,
resulting in uncreative behavior. However, the information
may be retrieved with the use of entirely new codes, providing
that a problem solver is able to recode the items constituting
his or her knowledge, that is, to label the pieces of information
kept in the LTM store in a new way, different from the initial
encoding. Analogical thinking is enhanced in this way, since
notions, memorized events, and other pieces of knowledge can
be retrieved on the basis of their similarity to other areas of
experience. It is a process particularly important for creativity if
the analogies and similes are remote and unusual, which
means that the pieces of knowledge utilized for the building
of the analogy have to be retrieved with cues other than the
ones used during the acquisition of knowledge.
As to the LTM search strategies, the problem consists in
making the search as global as possible. Robert Weisberg sug-
gests that the inability to use previous experience while solving
a new problem, a phenomenon frequently described in the
literature on mental ‘ruts’ and other blocks to creativity, may
result from ‘local’ memory search. This kind of search is limited
to the narrow, well-defined areas of knowledge stored in the
long-term memory, and does not apply to other areas of
knowledge, even though these regions could be highly relevant
to the problem at hand. A problem solver is unable to use some
fragments of his or her knowledge because they are ‘too distant’
from the areas defined by the problem space, and thus look
‘irrelevant’ to the problem. Of course, the distance between the
knowledge responsible for problem representation and some
potentially useful but neglected areas of experience may besuperficial or only seem to exist. Furthermore, the boundaries
between different fields of knowledge and expertise are usually
fuzzy and conventional, sometimes artificial; however, they
define the boundaries within which the memory search is
normally performed. In consequence, the search is likely to
be ‘local,’ that is, limited to the knowledge base that is directly
applicable to the problem being currently solved. In order to
make the search ‘global,’ that is, referring to the whole network
of semantic memory and conceptual knowledge as well as to
the vast number of episodes stored in LTM, the problem solver
has to surpass the between-domain boundaries through anal-
ogy, metaphorical grasp, and mostly through the redefinition
of the problem statement.
The creative search of memory does not have to be entirely
global; sometimes it suffices to make the search less local,
that is, less limited to the narrow conceptual boundaries
defined by the initial problem statement. Redefinition of the
problem statement naturally makes a problem solver more
likely to cross the conceptual boundaries, as the newly defined
problem requires a new set of information and provokes new
associations. However, making the search ‘less local’ may be a
deliberate strategy used by the problem solver, and trained
during sessions of creative problem solving, not necessarily
preceded by problem redefinition. On the other hand, redefi-
nition of the problem is unlikely to occur without the global
(or ‘less local’) search, because only the truly uncommon
information retrieved from memory is able to make people
perceive the problem in a fresh way.
Highly creative individuals are more inclined to global
memory search than less creative people. The network of
semantic memory of creative people is more compound, and
thus more apt to make remote, unusual associations. The
creative semantic memory is also more likely to be activated
as a whole network rather than restricted associative regions if a
priming stimulus is presented. The higher the general activa-
tion of the semantic network, the more likely it is that a person
will perform a global search of the information needed during
the problem solving session. Conversely, if the activation is
limited to small areas of the semantic network, defined by the
routine meaning of the priming stimulus, it is likely that a
person will perform only a local search, with all its uncreative
consequences.Conclusions
Obviously, creativity is not just the proper use of one’s mem-
ory. However, the purely creative phenomena known from the
studies of creative problem solving, like insight, analogical
transfer of knowledge, or unusual remote associations, pro-
bably result from the peculiarity of memory processes.
It is therefore justifiable to conclude that the memory of crea-
tive individuals differs qualitatively from the memory of less
creative people. The quantitative differences (for instance, the
sheer amount of knowledge about some topic) are probably
less important because there is no evidence that the more one
knows the more creative one is. On the contrary, experts are
frequent victims of rigidity andmental ruts, unless their knowl-
edge is flexible and creative due to the specificity of its
organization.
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